Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to describe the application of the Islamic financing method based on direct musharakah to the conventional capital asset pricing model yielding several interesting hypotheses.
Introduction
It is the ultimate purpose of this paper to outline theoretical foundations for an interest free investment partnership based on Islamic profit/loss sharing (PLS). This is done by utilization of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) under strict conditions of Islamic financing, and by comparison with conventional methods of interest based investments. Risk-return tradeoffs are undertaken for both Islamic financing based on interest free sharing contracts and for conventional interest based conventional investments, and several interesting commonalities and differences between the two methods are illustrated. The second section prepares the reader with a general framework concerning important founding principles of Islamic finance and their applicability to investment sharing. The third section discusses the conventional CAPM model, its conditions, and methodology. The fourth section provides an explicit theoretical account of Islamic financing by augmenting the CAPM model towards constraints found in the Islamic finance discipline, and provides a rational comparative discussion. The fifth and last section summarizes the findings of the paper.
The founding principles of Islamic finance
The importance of a financial system in any society, whether Islamic or conventional, occurs in the vital role that the financial system plays in creating incentives to reach an efficient allocation of resources, and to provide the required financial service intermediation in order to channel funds from savers to borrowers and to facilitate financial and money flow movements among agents in the economic system. Such facilitation requires an efficient re-allocation of resources from agents who have a surplus of financial resources to agents who have scarcity of financial resources.
Islamic finance is a mechanism for conducting such a facilitation. But, instead of direct transfer of funds from surplus agents to agents of scarce resources, Islamic financing requires a sharing of risk and returns between agents in the economy. Hence, whether agents have surplus or shortage of capital resources, all have some degree of risk bearing when deciding to invest. This is the main concern of Islamic finance based on binding PLS contracts. Agents are seen to complement each other in investment funding in an Islamic society.
There are several instruments of Islamic finance, yet all are based on the PLS mechanism: musharakah (capital-capital partnership), mudarabah (capital-labor partnership), murabahah (capital equipment joint ventures), al-ijara (leasing), and al-salam sale (forward sales). All these partnerships depend on the equivalent opportunity cost of capital by utilizing predetermined agreed upon margin of profit or subsequent loss between different economic agents. The measure of the opportunity cost of capital in Islamic financing is not measured by the neoclassical tradition (i.e. the internal rate of return on a project exceeding the market interest rate), but rather, since the margin of expected net profit or loss is agreed upon and satisfies the utility of both partners, then it is determined through equating the opportunity cost of capital with individual utility preferences, and on aggregate, yield a complementary social welfare surplus for both parties in a neo-Pareto efficient manner (Lotfy, 2005; El-Gamal, 2001 ). Such a principle has been pioneered by Ibn-Taymia in the early works of his literature.
In the recent two decades, both the Islamic finance theory and Islamic financial industry has witnessed lots of developments and progress. Nowadays, there exist 267 Islamic banks and financial institutions all over the world working under the Islamic finance principle. Those institutions are located in about forty-eight countries with value of assets of $260 billion and with an average growth rate of 23 per cent annually (Dubai Islamic Bank, 2005) . Hence, interest and promotion of Islamic financial products and institutions is welcomed all over the world because it offers diversity of alternatives for investors and consumers alike (Jomo, 1992) .
There are three main principles that govern Islamic finance as it relates to Islamic economic fundamentals:
1. the Principle of Universal Complementarity; 2. the Principle of the Abolition of Usury; and 3. the Principle of Justice in Al-Hisba.
The Principle of Universal Complementarity provides the general society of savers and borrowers, consumers and producers, government and private industry, etc., with a complementary role in achieving maximal social welfare. Thus, missed opportunities are themselves social losses, whereas marginal rates of substitution are not constant across different agents. Hence, there is no unified interest rate that acts as a benchmark of opportunity cost, but rather, investment shares and corresponding risks are allocated for their corresponding returns. This gives rise to the second principle: the Principle of the Abolition of Usury, which basically abolishes predetermined fixed interest amongst agents in the economy. Hence, cooperative agents would share profits and share losses depending on the actual performance of the investment. All economic agents, including banks and financial service institutions, have to obey this rule. This gives rise to highly differentiated investments pending their economic performance and no unified opportunity cost of capital. Justice, in Al Hisba, provides the ruling body a high degree of authority in terms of regulation of the market oriented economic system, such that agents have similar preferences through the Unity Precept of God and adherence to the previous two principles, whereas the "Executive" branch is implemented through the regulatory Al Hisba Institution, the "Legislative" is implemented through an Advisory Council (Al Shura), and with an independent "Judiciary" system. This system of governance guarantees no confiscation of property, all citizens having equal rights and equal entitlements, and agents receiving their appropriate differentiated reward in terms of wages (based on effort and education), and rent (based on risk and entrepreneurship). These principles are outlined in detail in Ibn Taymia's seminal writings, and recently put in modern format, by several writings of El-Gamal.
The conventional CAPM
Asset pricing in terms of expected returns and forgone opportunities is the cornerstone for conventional capital asset valuation. One of the core models interpreting asset behavior in terms of future rate of return expectations, in comparison to a risk-free interest rate acting as a benchmark for forgone opportunities, is the CAPM. The model framework is itself an extension of the net present value criterion which was based on the original twin works of Irving Fischer (1930 Fischer ( , 1965 , and that of Hirschleifer (1958) . The FischerHirschleifer methodology of investment decisions were attacked immensely because of its omission of financial risk as an explicit variable of exposition. Hence, inclusive of financial risk and investment returns, the CAPM model was then developed by Sharpe (1964) and further extended by Lintner (1965) , Fama and French (1992) and Markowitz (1997) . It gained fame after it was supported empirically based on a portfolio of stocks from the 1930s to the 1960s by Fama and MacBeth (1973) . Nevertheless, the CAPM methodology is itself an implicit valuation technique for the P/E and M/B ratios (price-to-earnings ratio and market-tobook value ratio), the latter prime determinants of stock market indices. It has been well established that the average return on a security is negatively related to these two ratios (Ross et al., 1999) , and since these ratios are themselves negatively related to investment risk, then it must be true that the average return on a security is itself positively related to its relative risk to that of the market, or beta. The most widely accepted form of the CAPM model is based on the following:(Equation 1) where (Equation 2)
In the above formulation of the CAPM methodology, R¯ I is the expected return on an individual investment (average return on investment), R¯ M is the expected return on the market (average return on the market), R F is the risk-free rate (minimum guaranteed rate of return with minimum risk), Cov (R I , R M ) is the covariance or correlation coefficient between the returns on a specific investment and the returns on the market, Var (R M ) is the variance of returns on the market, and β I is the relative risk level of a specific investment in relation to the risk level of the market.
Hence, β I > 1 would imply a risky investment relative to the market, β I < 1 implies a low risk investment, and β I =1 implies an equally risky investment.
Graphically, since the utility of a particular investor is increasing in average expected return and decreasing in risk level, such that monotonicity is in the direction of U ′ (R I ) > 0 and U ′ (β I )< 0, then the security market line (SML) can be drawn as in Figure 1 and must be tangent to maximum attainable utility due to monotonicity.
In essence, CAPM can be derived from Figure 1 
Interest-free CAPM based on Islamic financing
As discussed in the second section of this paper regarding the principles of Islamic finance, of which the Principle of the Abolition of Usury is key, let us now examine an interest-free approach to the preceding analysis of the CAPM based on investment partnerships and a sharing contract. Originally, it is seen that the conventional CAPM methodology utilizes a risk-free rate, an expected rate of return on the investment and an expected rate of return on the market, and the relative risk of the investment. Let the market premium be represented by the excess returns of the market over the risk-free rate:(Equation 3) then (Equation 4) where f(π E ) denotes expected economic profits of the investment.
Assume a PLS contract between actual investors and their corresponding lenders, with α being the share in partnership capital of the lender (such as banks), and in which 0< α< 1, such that the equivalent interest-free (sharing) partnership would require a rate of return R^ I given by: (Equation 5) where K is the total amount of investment in a certain project, (1 − α) is the investor's share based on the PLS contract, and [π E +R E K] is the amount of economic profits and its corresponding opportunity cost. In essence, Equation (5) states that the required rate of return based on a PLS contract to an investor is his share of profits, inclusive of opportunity costs, relative to initial investment capital. Consequently, Equations (7-9) are the conditions needed for the rate of return of an interest free PLS contract to exceed that of conventional interest bearing contract [3] . The key condition here is Equation (7): the lender's share of capital must be strictly below a maximum threshold level which itself is a function of project risk β and the implicit opportunity cost of capital γ with γ ′ (R F ) < 0. In essence, capital lenders (such as banks) must abide by a maximum partnership share inversely proportional to project risk and increasing with opportunity cost of capital.
An interesting dimension can be seen from the previous analysis. Specifically, if we normalize both returns to be equal to each other, implying:(see equation 8) then it can be easily shown [4] 
that:(Equation 9)
Without any partnership, as in conventional methods, in which α=0, Equation (11) states that β=1 is a necessary condition for Equation (10) to hold. With the existence of an Islamic partnership, α> 0, which necessarily implies β< 1.
Hence,(Equation 10)
This finding is particularly strong. The existence of a sharing contract necessarily yield a lower beta-risk of investments than that compared to the market. This is a pivotal finding in the field of Islamic finance.
But why is that the case?
I will attempt here several reasonings. The first reasoning is related to diminishing marginal productivity of capital. Suppose you have two stocks of capital K 1 and K 2 . Then, taking r(K 1 ) and r(K 2 ) as their returns: r(K 1 ) + r(K 2 ) > r(K 1 + K 2 ) due to diminishing returns to capital. The left hand side of this inequality is equivalent to the Islamic rate of return based on a sharing contract (such as that of a PLS contract), whereas the right-hand side is based on individual investment without a sharing partner, with the condition that the total capital for both is the same. If returns are imposed as equal in magnitude, whereas the risk of a sharing contract becomes inferior to that of the convention, then it is logical to argue that an Islamic sharing contract yields an inferior level of risk to that of the market. The second reasoning is related to business risk. If additive returns exceed their combined return, and return is positively related to business risk, then additive risk must exceed combined risk, and with the latter representing a sharing partnership and the former representing individual investments, then it is logical to conclude that combined risk of a single sharing contract will be inferior to the additive sum of the risk of its components.
Another interesting dimension can be deduced. Considering further normalization of both returns (Islamic and conventional) to equal each other, with Equation (10) binding, Equation (11) can be re-written as: (Equation 11) The imposed constraint in Equation (13) is a zero risk-free rate R F = 0. Thus, when there are no opportunity costs of capital based on no forgone interest, the sum of lender's share and relative risk level balances to unity. In other words, under the constraint of a zero risk-free rate, economic tradeoffs exist in risk-shares and not in risk-returns. Islamic sharing partnerships would entail a balance between contribution of shares in capital and risk level of investment. Lenders, in their rational spirit, would be willing to provide a small share in a risky investment, or conversely, a large share in a safe investment. The trade-off between degree of capital participation and degree of investment risk is a major requirement in the conduct of Islamic financing, with the strict condition of a zero risk-free rate of return.
The logical next question is: would a zero risk-free rate of return be optimal in the case of a sharing contract? To answer that question, I use the maximin approach of maximum return with minimum risk based on investment sharing and then deduce the first-order condition for a necessary solution followed by the second-order sufficiency condition. A rational maximum return strategy for an investment sharing contract is given by Given a β^ corresponding to maximum returns as in Equation (14), what is the optimal R F that minimizes β^?
To minimize β^ relative to R F , we need to minimize:(Equation 14)
This yields[6]:(Equation 15)
Thus, a zero risk-free rate of return is optimal in the case of a sharing contract.
Conclusion
The paper establishes an Islamic finance approach to the CAPM, based primarily on the Principle of the Abolition of Usury and the Principle of Universal Complimentarity. Taking Direct Musharakah (direct investment partnerships with no predetermined fixed interest and a PLS agreement) as the baseline of analysis, and with a pure theoretical methodology, the paper concludes the following:
1. The existence of a sharing contract necessarily yield a lower beta-risk of investments than that compared to the market. 2. In order for the above to hold, capital lenders must abide by an established maximum partnership share inversely proportional to project risk and increasing with equivalent opportunity cost of capital. 3. Under the constraint of a zero risk-free rate, economic trade-offs exist in risk-shares and not in riskreturns, i.e. the sum of lender's share and relative risk level balances to unity at equilibrium. 4. A zero risk-free rate of return is optimal in the case of a direct sharing contract.
These findings are particularly strong. However, they are limited by the assumptions of theory, and are only valid for the case of a direct Islamic sharing agreement (direct musharakah). Extensions of these findings on other Islamic financing instruments remain open. Notes 1. Equating the slope of the SML at A and B, respectively, yield:
With minor mathematical manipulation, this yields the CAPM equation (1). 2. The required inequality is R^ I > R I with the left hand side the equivalent Islamic rate of return and the right-hand side is the conventional rate of return. We can solve for α * that obeys the above inequality by setting: (1 − α * )(π E + R F K)/ K > R F + β π E / K (since the actual investor's share of profits is 1 − α * ). This leads to (1 − α * )> R F K+β π E /π E + R F K, hence, α * < π E (1 − β ) /π E − R F K. Taking π E as common and simplifying we get α * < 1 − β / 1 − R F K/ π E . Knowing that R F K/ π E is necessarily less than unity, since the numerator is a component of the denominator, then it is established that α * < 1 − β /γ with 0 < γ< 1 with γ ≡ π E − R F K / π E . 3. From Equation (8), γ< 1 is always binding since it is implicit here that business profits are the numerator (equal to economic profits minus their corresponding opportunity costs), whereas the denominator is total economic profits, and accordingly, their ratio is strictly less than unity and strictly positive. 4. From Equation (10) and (Equation 7), by direct comparison, it is seen that:(1 − α )(π E + R F K) = R F K + β π E , hence proving Equation (11). 5. From Equation (11) and (Equation 13), α=(1 − β^ ) /( 1 − R F K/ π E ). 6. Let the β^ that maximizes returns be given by an investor's rational decision in Equation (14).
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